Can Job-Loss Growth be Really Inclusive?

Can Job-Loss Growth be Really Inclusive? Veeraiah Konduri THE results of the 68th round survey of the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) on employment and unemployment reflect the deep-rooted convulsions that are taking place in the labour market in general and in rural India’s labour market in particular. The survey findings are based on a large sample of 1,01,724 households covering 7,469 villages and 5,268 urban blocks. The findings of the survey counter the government’s claim of inclusive growth and of benefits reaching out to a higher percentage of the working age population, vis-à-vis the overall population --- a claim which is typically coined in the policymaking circles as reaping of the demographic dividend. The survey, in fact, confirms the persistence of job-loss growth in India. The latest survey’s findings bring out three basic features. The first is about the transformational changes in Indian agriculture, the second relates to informalisation of the job markets and the third is about the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). FINDINGS IN A NUTSHELL It would be appropriate to consider a comparison of the results of 61st, 66th and 68th round surveys in order to assess the developments in job market during the UPA’s tenure, as this is the first government which has continued for more than one term in succession since India embarked on the globalisation policies. To present the findings in a nutshell, the rate of employment creation slipped from 39.2 per cent in 2009-10 to 38.6 per cent in 2011-12 while it was at 42 per cent in 2004-05. That means the nine years tenure over nearly two terms of the United Progressive Alliance saw our employment generation capacity going down by 3.4 per cent. This happened when the GDP growth graph rose more than nine per cent along with all three sectors witnessing upward change. (See Table 1 alongside.) The 68th survey findings are being interpreted in such a way, however, as if the fall in the growth rate of economy is the reason behind the slide-down in employment generation. The pace of economic growth is no doubt on a downturn for the last two years, but the downturn in employment generation goes far back, and the record over the last nine years which clearly indicates the job-loss growth. TABLE I Indicator (per cent) 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 GDP 7.60 9.49 9.60 9.30 6.70 8.40 8.39 6.88 Agriculture 1.6 5.1 4.2 5.8 0.1 1.0 7.0 2.5 Industry 9.4 9.7 12.2 9.7 4.4 8.4 7.2 3.9 Services 9.4 10.9 10.1 10.3 10.0 10.5 9.3 9.4 Several studies about the development of capitalism in our society talk of the need of an economic system in which the overall dependence on agriculture for employment is replaced by dependence on wage labour. To put it simply, in a capitalist economy, gainful employment through industrialisation has to be higher than that in agriculture. Since independence, several analyses have criticised the government for not taking steps to reduce the pressure on agriculture. But for the first time now in India’s economic history, the overall dependence of the labouring population on agricultural work has come down to less than 50 per cent. Table 2, given alongside, reflects the sectoral composition in terms of employment, as the changes in abstract numbers. On an average, the table says, 840 people out of 10,000 opted out from agriculture between 2004-05 to 2011-12, which reflects the reduced potential of employment generation in agriculture. The table presents the distribution of workers (per 10,000) according to the Usual Principal Status by Industry in different rounds of NSSO surveys. TABLE 2 Indicator 68th Round 66th Round 64th Round Primary sector 4890 5320 5730 Secondary sector 2426 2250 1870 Tertiary sector 2686 2540 2410 The working age population -- labour force -- which stood at 400.8 million in 2004-05 (61st round survey of NSSO), increased to 423.9 million by 2009-10 (66th round survey) and further to 431.7 million by 2011-12 (68th round survey). That means the growth in workforce increased by 30.9 million between 2004-05 to 20011-12 whereas it could add only absorb 15 million during the last nine years in the actual working population. Though it looks like a great achievement, when compared to the levels of job creation during the period 2004-05 to 2009-10, it could only add up one million new jobs while the remaining 14 million jobs were added during the second term of the UPA, which is a major addition but comes in the form of jobs generated by the MGNREGA. It is thus clear that the working population actually declined during the most sizzling phase of economic growth. But while less labour force is coming into the job market, the economy is using them as an instrument to displace the formal or regularised workforce. However, their inclusion in the informal sector is nothing but a loss for both types of labour. The creation of decent employment outside agriculture is one of the biggest challenges that confront India which is trying to achieve faster, sustainable and more inclusive growth, at least in the words of policymakers. INFORMALISATION OF WORKFORCE Now we come to the second feature, i.e., informalisation of workforce. During the 11th Five Year Plan period the average GDP growth was eight per cent whereas the average annual growth in employment generation was down to a mere 0.6 per cent. This indicates the fact that a higher GDP growth did not translate into a higher rate of employment generation. Since the global depression, employment slid down further in tandem with the overall growth rate of Indian economy. In the interim period unemployment rate went up to 10.2 per cent. A more critical structural shift in Indian labour market comes from the agriculture sector. The proportion of workers engaged in farm related activities now accounts for only 49 per cent. Of the remaining, manufacturing absorbed 24 per cent and the service sector, 27 per cent. The pace of employment generation in these sectors, in numbers as well as in percentage, slowed down, leading to a dramatic decrease even in the number of the self-employed. But the Planning Commission refused to acknowledge the fact as well as the survey results till recently. Self-employment came down from 25.8 crore to 23.3 crore between 2009-10 and 2011-12 --- a clear 2.5 crore fall. However, it is not that this reduction in self-employment was counter-balanced by any growth in formal employment. These 2.5 crore self-employed individuals who lost their livelihood joined the casual labour force which went up from 13 crore to 15.3 crore --- a clear indication of the informalisation of labour force. This shift reflects the fact that the labour force is moving away from low value employment in agriculture to underpaid employment in the informal sector instead of moving up on the value scale by becoming parts of the formal labour market. TABLE 3 NSSO Survey LFPR WPR UR 61st Round 66th Round 68th Round 392 365 364 380 374 354 31 25 27 Table 3 helps us to understand the changing dynamics of labour market in India. All the figures are about the usual principal status. Decline in Labour Force Participation Ratio (LFPR), an indication of an economy’s inability to put to use the labour power for productive gain, is increasing, which is not a good indication. The LFPR was down from 40 per cent in 2009-10 to 39.5 per cent in 2011-12. The reason for the decline in labour force participation rate is the failure of manufacturing and service sectors to absorb the labour force that has moved out of agriculture; these people in turn had had to join the standing army of the unemployed or the casual labour force. This indicates that the economy has kept aside a considerable section of the working age population, preventing them from taking part in nation building by being gainfully employed. Also, this indicates a decline of the share of labour in the GDP and national wealth. When it comes to the women workforce, during the last nine years, it witnessed a steep reduction. As per the survey findings, it witnessed 90 lakh reduction in women workforce from causal labour. Out of every 1,000 women capable of working, only 327 could be employed in 2004-05, and the proportion went down to 261 by 2009-10 and further to 248 by 2011-12. On an average, the rate of reduction of women in the workforce was around 4.5 per cent between 2004-05 and 2009-10, which slightly improved by 2011-12, thanks to the MGNREGA. As the chances of being employed by the rural economy are drying up, male workers are migrating to urban locations, leaving the agricultural operations to women workers. Had the MGNREGA not been there, the fate of women workers would evidently have been much worse. As for the third feature, the findings of the 68th round NSSO survey brought out an important fact about the MGNREGA which is being ridiculed by various sorts of thinktanks and self-declared experts. There has been a widespread misinformation campaign that the pressure of wages is increasing due to the high benchmark set out by the MGNREGA. The average daily wage received by casual labours in rural areas engaged in public works other than the MGNREGA work was Rs 121 whereas those engaged in the MGNREGA earned only Rs 107 a day. At the same time, the average daily wage received by casual labours engaged in works other than public works was Rs 170 in urban areas. This confirms that the MGNREGA is not functioning as an impediment in the job market. After the implementation of the MGNREGA, the number of jobs generated by it went up substantially, as mentioned above, by around 14 million, out of which women accounted for an addition of 3.5 million. This is one third of those who lost their livelihood sources during the pre-MGNREGA period. It is evident that while the agrarian distress is pushing the workforce to move out of agriculture and other rural employments in order to try their luck in urban areas, the rural as well as overall employment scenario would have much worse than this if only, contrary to the criticism being mounted by a few, the MGNREGA had not been there. In sum, the 68th round of NSSO survey confirms that India is now undergoing a phase of what has been called job-loss growth. But job-loss growth excludes and restricts a considerably large number of working population from entering the job market, and this has its own spiralling effects on the economy in the long run. It is clear that any job-loss growth can never be inclusive in its nature, no matter what our policymakers shout from the rooftops.

RBI Paper Explodes Govt’s Inclusion Claim

RURAL CREDIT RBI Paper Explodes Govt’s Inclusion Claim Konduri Veeraiah WHILE releasing the progress report of UPA-2, the prime minister claimed that the growth process in India over the last decade has been more inclusive. Of late the policy documents of the government, including the finance minister’s reply to the debate on allowing more private banks, also harped on financial inclusion, which means access to formal sector financial services for all sections of the people. Apart from increasing the number of bank accounts or branches in proportion to population, another criterion to judge the extent of financial inclusion is the share of funds borrowed by the rural poor from formal financial institutions. FINDINGS BELIE GOVT’S CLAIM But recent revelations from different sources — like the RBI’s working paper, 2009-10 survey of employment by National Sample Survey Organisation, and the Census 2011 — belie the government’s claim. The research conducted by the Reserve Bank of India confirmed the fact that nearly half of India’s population is excluded from the institutional rural credit market. This is also corroborated by the recently released NSSO data. Authenticating the criticism coming from the Left, these reports conclude that the so called reforms have by and large excluded the rural people from the institutionalised credit facilities. This is one of the key components in the structure of poverty as identified by the Human Development Report 2013. The RBI’s working paper titled “Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India: Regulatory Policies Need to Recognise Changing Landscape” clearly states that informal credit channels that were getting pushed to the back between the 1970s and the 1990s are now playing a key role in the rural credit market. In contrast to the claims about financial inclusion, the paper concludes that two-fifths of rural households still depend on informal credit which “indicates further scope for financial inclusion in rural India.” Institutional credit rose from 29. 2 per cent in 1971 to 61.2 per cent by 1991, but then started declining after it. Similarly, the non-institutional rural credit which slid down to 38.8 per cent in 1981 from its peak 92.8 per cent in 1951, started to shore up after the ‘reforms.’ This clearly indicates that the ‘reforms’ process has excluded a majority of the population from the institutional credit sources. The informal credit delivery channels gradually declined during the 1960s and very nearly broke down during the 1970s. That was the high time in terms of public policy when banks were nationalised with a mandate to expand their rural coverage and widen their ambit of priority to include agriculture and allied activities. This was extended to providing credit facilities to other forms of livelihood sources by bringing them under the ambit of rural institutional financing. (See Table I below.) TABLE I Institutional and Non-Institutional Rural Credit (in percent) Category 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 Institutional Agencies 7.2 14.8 29.2 61.2 64.0 57.1 Government 3.3 5.3 6.7 4 5.7 2.3 Co-op Society / Bank 3.1 9.1 20.1 28.6 18.6 27.3 Commercial Banks including RRBs 0.8 0.4 2.2 28.0 29.0 24.5 Insurance 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 Provident Fund 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 Other Institutional Agencies 9.3 2.4 Non-Institutional Agencies 92.8 85.2 70.8 8.8 36.0 42.9 Landlords 1.5 0.9 8.6 4.0 4.0 1.0 Rural Moneylenders 24.9 45.9 23.1 8.6 6.3 10.0 Professional Moneylenders 44.8 14.9 13.8 8.3 9.4 19.6 Traders and Commission Agents 5.5 7.7 8.7 3.4 7.1 2.6 Relatives and Friends 14.2 6.8 13.8 9.0 6.7 7.1 Others 1.9 8.9 2.8 4.9 2.5 2.6 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 Similarly, the banking statistics released by the RBI also confirms the understanding. There is no doubt that the banking network tripled after the banks nationalisation and adoption of development banking. At the same time, mere expansion of banking network does not suffice to meet the goal of inclusion in terms of lending from formal banking channels. When we consider this, we get to understand that even after the nationalisation of banks and expansion of bank branches, these primarily worked as channels for mobilising capital from rural households instead of infusing the much needed liquid credit into the rural economy. (See Table II below.) TABLE II Year No of Offices Deposits (in Lakhs) Credit (in Lakhs) 1980 16,111 464355 264284 1991 35,134 3100980 1859897 2002 32,443 132999542 15942346 MONEYLENDERS STILL FLOURISHING In recent years, policy interventions have indeed led to a doubling of agricultural credit but the limited access of small and marginal farmers to institutional credit continues to be a matter of concern. Even now the non-institutional rural credit is being administered by three channels — landlords, rural moneylenders and professional moneylenders; all of which are the informal credit sources. After nationalisation of banks in 1969, a package of policies and initiatives ensured that the share of moneylenders in rural credit fell from 61.7 per cent in 1951-61 to mere 20.9 per cent by 1981 and further to 19.7 by 1991. Despite the fact that the country witnessed a rise in rural banking and state aided, supported and financed instruments of financial inclusion such as cooperative banks, NABARD and bank branches whose primary responsibility is to take care of the cultivators’ needs in their specific areas, moneylenders not only persisted in rural India but their operations also experienced enormous expansion. The available data reflect the stagnation in rural banking with the onset of economic ‘reforms,’ particularly after the banking sector liberalisation. In the post-1991 era, the banking sector deviated from the development banking mandate and reverted back to maximising its profits. To ensure this, public sector banks started trimming their rural branches and staff to reduce their overheads. This is revealed by the 2002 AIDIS survey which concluded that 43 per cent of rural households continue to rely on informal finance. The situation today is that 15 out of the major 21 states have witnessed a fall in institutional credit. What is worrying is that the proportion of farmers taking such loans has been increasing and they have more than four-fifths of the operational holdings, thus indicating that nearly 80 per cent of small and marginal farmers are far from accessing the institutional credit to meet their needs. This, the RBI paper concludes, is due to the inadequacy of the credit received from formal institutions, that too not at the time of need, and with a lot of procedural hassles. The data also indicate that despite a considerable expansion of the scope of priority lending and an enormous expansion of financial services sector, there has been an increase in the number of private players, both foreign and domestic. During the winter session of parliament, when the government pushed through a bill to facilitate the corporate houses opening banks, the finance minister told the house that these steps would help expand and deepen the web of branch network, based on which the government intended to achieve its objective of financial inclusion. But the RBI paper says that a mere increase in the number of branches and of financial services does not automatically translate into financial inclusion. Table II clearly shows the gaps between deposits from and credit outflows to the rural economy, thus validating the criticism that nationalised banks treated rural India primarily as a source of deposit mobilisation more than an area needing credit disbursals expansion. Thus one of the reasons for continued dependence on money-lenders, as identified by the RBI, is that formal credit delivery structures have not fully stretched their penetration to villages. DEFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING The RBI paper repeatedly refers to formal credit as the flow of financial products in the country’s formal financial system. But here lies a point. The RBI treats all institutionalised lending, both private and public, as formal credit. But these also includes the micro finance institutions, thrift groups and chit fund companies like the infamous Sarada company that wrecked the life of rural poor under TMC rule in West Bengal. Similarly, though the RBI treats the so called micro financing as a formal channel, one cannot really equate it with formal nationalised banks. If we consider these two sources of rural credit — chit funds and MFIs — as non-formal channels, the percentage of rural poor depending on such channels goes close to 90 per cent. One more important aspect has to be taken into consideration. Since the beginning of the ‘reforms,’ the rural credit market has changed. Till 1991, the credit market has been primarily linked to the productive credit which is channelled to farmers in the first instance. With the central government bringing certain other welfare measures such as financing self-employment and establishing finance development corporations for the SC, ST, BC and other groups, rural credit has gradually shifted to non-farm sources of employment. At the same time, the infusion of liquid capital into the rural economy took a beating in the ‘reforms’ period. But as the state finance for rural livelihood sources dried up, it created scope for a revival of the informal, non-institutional credit channels, with the people resorting to these sources to meet their contingent requirements. That is why we find the rural labour borrowing from moneylenders, still at the level of 1999, despite the opening of private banks in large numbers and the mushrooming of MFIs across the country. Thus recent developments in financial sector have strengthened the division in which asset owning classes are garnering institutional credit in rural India whereas non-asset owning classes are left at the mercy of the private, informal channels of rural credit. This is resulting in distress situations of the kind debtors in Andhra Pradesh are experiencing.

Mapping Sahmat - Frontline

Mapping Sahmat - Frontline

Over 2,000 fewer farmers every day by P Sainath

The mistaken notion that the 53 per cent of India’s population ‘dependent on agriculture’ are all ‘farmers’ leads many to dismiss the massive farmers’ suicides as trivial There are nearly 15 million farmers (‘Main’ cultivators) fewer than there were in 1991. Over 7.7 million less since 2001, as the latest Census data show. On average, that’s about 2,035 farmers losing ‘Main Cultivator’ status every single day for the last 20 years. And in a time of jobless growth, they’ve had few places to go beyond the lowest, menial ends of the service sector. A December 2012 report of the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (IAMR) — a part of the Planning Commission — puts it this way: “employment in total and in non-agricultural sectors has not been growing. This jobless growth in recent years has been accompanied by growth in casualization and informalization.” It speaks of an “an absolute shift in workers from agriculture of 15 million to services and industry.” But many within the sector also likely moved from farmer to agricultural labourer status. Swelling the agrarian underclass. So how many farmers do we have? Census 2011 tells us we now have 95.8 million cultivators for whom farming is their main occupation. That’s less than 8 per cent of the population. (Down from 103 million in 2001 and 110 million in 1991). Include all marginal cultivators (22.8 million) and that is still less than 10 per cent of the population. Even if you count together all cultivators and agricultural labourers, the number would be around 263 million or 22 per cent of the population. (Interestingly, this reduced figure comes after a few big states have actually reported a rise in the total number of cultivators. Since 85 per cent of all marginal workers reported more than a 100 days work, this could possibly reflect the reverse pull of MNREGA, among other factors). Between 1981 and 1991, the number of cultivators (main workers), actually went up from 92 million to 110 million. So the huge decline comes post-1991. Hold on: aren’t 53 per cent of the population farmers? No. That’s a common fallacy. The over 600 million Indians dependent on agriculture are not all farmers. They are deployed in an array of related activities — including fisheries. This confusion is widespread and innocent. Yet, there are also a few whose colossal ignorance leads them to dismiss the country’s massive farmers’ suicides as trivial. For instance: “at least half of the Indian workforce is engaged in farming. This fact points to a much lower suicide rate per 100,000 individuals for farmers than in the general population.” Note how easily those ‘engaged in farming’ become ‘farmers!’ As a notion it borders on the whacko. It goes: After all, 53 out of every 100 Indians are farmers. So our 270,940 farm suicides since 1995 are a low number on a population base of over 600 million. So low that we should be agitated over how the suicide rate in the general population can be brought “down to the levels prevailing amongst farmers.” Never mind for now the appalling moral position that a quarter of a million human beings taking their lives is hardly alarming. The Bhopal gas tragedy, the worst industrial disaster in human terms, claimed over 20,000 lives. But in this perverse logic, since that was less than 0.003 per cent of the then population, it is rendered meaningless. That position says more about its authors than about the suicides. It shows they are clueless about who a farmer is — and about what the data show. It shows even greater ignorance of who defines and counts a ‘farmer suicide.’ The Census records cultivators. The police count suicides. The police do not read the Census. Not for definitions, anyway. The Census groups the population into workers and non-workers. The latter would be infants, children, students, housewives, unemployed, aged and retired people. Farmers, or cultivators come under ‘Workers’ — a huge category covering many varied groups. Now rural workers account for close to 70 per cent of all workers. And rural workers consist of farmers, agricultural labourers and non-farm workers. Cultivators (main workers) in the Census are barely eight per cent of the population as a whole. (That’s after a two-decade secular decline in this group). The ongoing farm suicides — 184,169 of them since 2001 according to the National Crime Records Bureau — are taking place on a smaller and shrinking base. Their intensity has hardly diminished. In most of the States accounting for two-thirds of all farm suicides, the intensity has likely risen. Of course distress affects a much wider population dependent on agriculture. (Farmer bankruptcies crush the village carpenter, and even play a role in weaver suicides). The sufferings of others are as real. It is not as if the agricultural labourer or non-farm worker is having a great time. Both sections have seen distress migrations — and suicides. (For that matter the owner of a small industrial unit in an urban city could be distress-hit). Their suicides are no less tragic. But it is vital to know who officially gets counted as a farmer. And who gets listed in the ‘farmers’ suicides. For that tells us more about the ongoing tragedy and gives us a sense of its awful scale. Everybody who works in the film industry is not an actor. Everyone in the educational system is not a student. And all those in the 53 per cent of the population related to the farming sector are not farmers. Even among those who are, only a limited group gets counted as such when police and governments make farmers’ suicide lists. Cultivators are counted by the Census. Suicides are recorded by police stations across the country. The numbers collated by State governments. Very different approaches are involved. The Census considers someone a cultivator if he or she operates a piece of land — which they may or may not own; State governments and police count only those with a title to land as farmers. The Census records two kinds of cultivators: ‘Main workers’ and ‘marginal workers.’ The latter are more like agricultural labourers or non-farm workers since farming is not their main activity. A ‘Main worker’ in cultivation is someone for whom that is the major occupation for at least half the year. That group makes barely eight per cent of the population as a whole. Suicides among the others in the agrarian world (within that “53 per cent”) won’t be recorded as ‘farmer suicides.’ Try getting State governments and their police to do that! Even within the ‘recognised’ eight per cent, those whose title to land is not clear will not be listed as farmers’ suicides, should they take their own lives. For instance, women and tenant farmers are routinely excluded. Even eldest sons running the farms — with the land still in the names of their aged fathers — would also be omitted. Police and State governments run the suicide lists, not the Census. Nor does the NCRB, which has neither the vested interest nor the ability to fiddle that data. It merely collates what the State Crime Record Bureaus submit to it. Hence, the Chhattisgarh government could brazenly declare a ‘zero farm suicides’ figure in 2011. That after the State saw over 7,500 of them (by its own admission) between 2006-10. With all the fiddles in the data, the numbers and intensity remain appalling. Maharashtra revels in such fraud. With close to 54,000 since 1995, the State has been the worst in farm suicides for over a decade. And even those numbers conceal major exclusions. They’ve invented categories like ‘Farmer’s relatives suicides,’ or “non-genuine” suicides, in order to further trim the numbers. So the State governments and their police, have immense power in re-defining who a farmer is. Watch out for more and more States doing ‘a Chhattisgarh’ and declaring ‘zero’ farm suicides in coming months and years.

Jayati Ghosh in APAWU conference at Guntur

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2014లో అధికారమే చింత !

2014లో అధికారమే చింత ! శుక్రవారం నుండీ రెండు రోజుల పాటు జైపూర్‌లో కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ చింతన శిబిరం జరుగుతుంది. గత నెల్లో సూరజ్‌ కుండ్‌లో జరిగిన సమావేశాలు సంస్కరణల విషయంలో పార్టీకి ప్రభుత్వానికి మధ్య సయోధ్య కోసం జరిగినవైతే ప్రస్తుతం జరుగుతున్న మేధో మధనం సూరజ్‌కుండ్‌ నిర్ణయాల మార్గదర్శకత్వంలో పార్టీని రానున్న ఎన్నికలకు సన్నద్ధం చేసేందుకు ఉద్దేశించి నవని చెప్పవచ్చు. ఈ సమావేశాల్లో పాల్గొనే వెయ్యికి పైగా ప్రతినిధుల్లో మూడొంతుల మంది యువజన కాంగ్రెస్‌ నేతలే ఉండాలని కాంగ్రెస్‌ అధిష్టానం ఆదేశించింది. దాంతో ఈ శిబిరం నిర్వ హణ యావత్తూ రాహుల్‌బాబా చుట్టూ తిరగనున్నదని స్పష్టం అవుతోంది. జైపూర్‌ సమావేశాలకు తక్షణ నేపథ్యం ఢిల్లీలో అత్యాచారం, దానికి ప్రజా ప్రతిస్పందన, పాక్‌ సరిహద్దుల్లో ఉద్రిక్తత, ఎన్నికల్లో గెలుపే లక్ష్యంగా ప్రారంభించిన నగదు బదిలీ పథకంలో గందరగోళం, రెండో దశ ఆర్థిక సంస్కరణలకు తెరచాప ఎత్తటం వంటి పరిణామాలు తక్షణ నేపథ్యంగా ఉన్నాయి. ఈ పరిణామాలన్నీ అటు పార్టీని, ఇటు ప్రభుత్వాన్ని ప్రజా కోర్టులో బోనులో నిలబెట్టిన పరిణామాలే. ఈ సంవత్సరం ఎనిమిది రాష్ట్రాల్లో ఎన్నికలు జరగనున్నాయి. ఈ ఎన్నికలు 2014లో జరగనున్న పార్లమెంట్‌ ఎన్నికలకు డ్రస్‌ రిహార్సల్స్‌ వంటివి. అందువల్ల 2014 ఎన్నికల వ్యూహాన్ని ఖరారు చేసి సదరు వ్యూహాన్ని పరీక్షకు పెట్టాల్సిన పరిస్థితి కాంగ్రెస్‌ ముందుంది. అంతేకాదు. అవినీతి బూతం నీడన ప్రభుత్వం ఉందన్న సార్వత్రిక ప్రజాభిప్రాయం నుండి బయటకు వచ్చి ప్రభత్వాన్ని ప్రజలకు చేరువ చేయాల్సిన అత్యవసర స్థితిలో కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ ఉంది. మరోవైపున చిందంబరం, మన్మోహన్‌, మాంటెక్‌సింగ్‌ త్రయం నేతృత్వంలో ఆర్థిక వ్యవస్థ మొత్తంగా గుత్త పెట్టుబడిదారుల ప్రయోజనాల మేరకు నిర్ణయాలకై పరుగులు పెట్టిస్తున్నది. ఖజానాకు లక్షలాది కోట్ల రూపాయల ఆదాయం తెచ్చి పెట్టే పన్నుఎగవేత నియంత్రణ నిబంధనలు మొదలు, ఫ్యూచర్స్‌ ట్రేడింగ్‌పై పన్ను వేయటం వంటి చర్యల వరకు రెండేళ్ల పాటు వాయిదా వేశారు. ఈ పరిస్థితుల్లో కేంద్ర ప్రభుత్వ ఆదాయం పెంచుకోవటానికి ప్రజల పై భారాలు వేయటం తప్ప మరో మార్గం లేదంటున్నారు. ఈ భారాల కత్తికి తేనె పూసే బాధ్యత జైపూర్‌ మేధోమధన శిబిరంపై పడుతుంది.. ఢిల్లీ అత్యాచార ఉదంతం, కేజ్రీవాల్‌ కొత్త పార్టీ వంటి పరిణామాల నేపథ్యంలో కాంగ్రెస్‌ పట్ల మధ్యతరగతి ప్రజల్లో అప్రతిష్టపాలైంది. గత సంవత్సర కాలంగా అవినీతి వ్యతిరేక ఉద్యమం, మహిళలపై అత్యాచారాల వ్యతిరేకత ఉద్యమంలో మధ్యతరగతి శ్రేణులు ముందు పీఠిన నిలవటం దీనికి ఉదాహరణగా చెప్పవచ్చు. ప్రతిఘటనోద్యమానికి ఆలంబనగా మారిన ఇంటర్నెట్‌ ఆలంబనగా మారటంతో కాంగ్రెస్‌లో యువతరాన్ని ఈ దిశగా కార్మోన్ముఖులను చేసేందుకు జైపూర్‌ శిబిరం దిశానిర్దేశం చేస్తుందని చెబుతున్నారు. ప్రస్తుతం నిర్వహిస్తున్న శిబిరం నాల్గోది. స్వాతంత్య్రానంతరం అధికారం చేపట్టిన కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ నెహ్రూ ప్రతిష్ట నీడన తన వైఫల్యాలన్నీ చక్కబెట్టుకోగలిగింది. నెహ్రూ అనంతరం ఇందిరాగాంధీ నేతృత్వంలో అధికారానికి వచ్చిన కాంగ్రెస్‌ నెహ్రూతరం, ఇందిరా తరం మధ్య నెలకొన్న ఆధిపత్య పోరు నేపథ్యంలో 1974లో తొలిసారి ఇటువంటి శిబిరం నిర్వహించారు. మరోవైపున 70దశకం నాటి ఆర్థిక సంక్షోభం, అఖిల పక్ష ఉద్యమాలు ప్రభుత్వాన్ని ఇరకాటంలో పెట్టాయి. అవినీతిపై లోక్‌నాయక్‌ జయప్రకాష్‌ నారాయణ ప్రారంభించిన ఉద్యమం, ఆర్థిక సమస్యలపై వామపక్షాలు నిర్వహించిన అఖిల పక్ష ఉద్యమాలు ప్రభుత్వానికి ఊపిరి సలపనీయలేదు. అటువంటి పరిస్థితుల్లో రాజకీయ ఎజెండాను ఇందిరాగాంధీ చేతుల్లోకి తీసుకునేందుకు 1974లో ఉత్తరప్రదేశ్‌లోని బులంద్‌షహర్‌ జిల్లాలో నరోరా అనే చోట చింతన శిబిరం జరిగింది. ఈ శిబిరం చర్చల నేపథ్యంలోనే కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ దళితుల సమస్యలపై దృష్టి పెట్టటం, భూ సంస్కరణలను మళ్లీ తన ఎజెండాలోకి తీసుకోవటం వంటి సానుకూల చర్యలు చేపట్టింది. దాంతో ప్రతిపక్షాలు ప్రారంభించిన జాతీయ స్థాయి ఆందోళన నేపథ్యంలో తలెత్తిన ప్రతికూల పవనాలను తట్టుకుని ఇందిరా గాంధీ నేతృత్వంలో మళ్లీ పార్టీ అధికారానికి రాగలిగింది. తర్వాత మళ్లీ 1998లో మధ్యప్రదేశ్‌లోని పంచమఢిలోను, 2003లో సిమ్లాలోనూ ఇటువంటి శిబిరాలు నిర్వహించింది కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ. పివి నరసింహారావు నేతృత్వంలో కాంగ్రెస్‌ ప్రభుత్వం అధికారం కోల్పోయిన సమయంలో పార్టీని తిరిగి గాంధీ పరివారం చెప్పు చేతుల్లోకి తెచ్చేందుకు 1998 నాటి సమావేశాలు దారి తీశాయని చెప్పవచ్చు. నాటి నుండి నేటి వరకు సోనియా గాంధీ కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీకి అప్రతిహతంగా అధ్యక్షత వహిస్తూ వస్తున్నారు. పంచమఢి సమావేశాలకు మరో ప్రాముఖ్యత కూడా ఉంది. 13 రోజుల వాజ్‌ పేయి ప్రభుత్వం పతనం తర్వాత జరిగిన ఈ సమావేశాలు సంకీర్ణ రాజకీయాలు భారతదేశ పరిస్థితులకు సరిపడవని, కాంగ్రెస్‌ ఒక్కటే జాతీయ స్థాయిలో ప్రభుత్వం ఏర్పాటు చేయగల శక్తిగా ఉంటుందని ఈ సమావేశం తీర్మానించింది. పంచమఢి తీర్మానం నేపథ్యంలో ప్రత్యామ్నాయ లౌకిక ప్రభుత్వం ఏర్పాటు చేయగల పరిస్థితుల్లో కాంగ్రెస్‌ ముందుకు రాకపోవటంతో 2004 వరకు అధికరానికి దూరంగా ఉండిపోవాల్సి వచ్చింది. 2004 పార్లమెంట్‌ ఎన్నికలకు ముందు ఆరు నూరైనా కేంద్రంలో అధికారానికి రావటం ఏకైక లక్ష్యంగా పెట్టుకున్న కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ 2003లో సిమాల్లో మరోమారు మేధోమధనానికి పూనుకొన్నది. ఈ సమావేశాల్లోనే కాంగ్రెస్‌ సంకీర్ణ ప్రభుత్వంలో భాగస్వామి కావటానికి సిద్ధమని ప్రకటించింది. 2004 ఎన్నికల ఫలితాలు, పర్యవసానాలు పాఠకులకు విదితమే. మళ్లీ ఇప్పుడు జైపూర్‌లో అటువంటి మేధో మధనానికి సిద్ధమైంది కాంగ్రెస్‌ పార్టీ. ఈ సమావేశాల్లో మొత్తం ఐదు అంశాలపై కమీషన్లుగా చర్చించనున్నారు. రాజకీయ సవాళ్లు, సామాజిక ఆర్థిక సవాళ్లు, ప్రపంచ పరిణామాలు, నిర్మాణం, మహిళల సాధికారతలపై ప్రత్యేకత చర్చలు జరిపి తీర్మానాలు చేయనున్నారు. రాజీకయ సవాళ్లలో తెలంగాణ సమస్య ప్రత్యేక స్థానం ఆక్రమించనుంది. ఎకె అంటోని నేతృత్వంలో సంకీర్ణాలపై ప్రత్యేక తీర్మానం చేయనున్నారు. సామాజిక ఆర్థిక సమస్యలపై దిగ్విజరుసింగ్‌ నేతృత్వంలో తీర్మానం, సామాజిక మీడియా విషయంపై సమాచార ప్రసార మంత్రి మనీష్‌ తివారి తీర్మానాలు ప్రతిపాదించనున్నారు. ఈ సమావేశాల్లోనే రాహుల్‌ బాబాను పార్టీ వ్యూహరచయితగా కూడా పరిచయం చేసేందుకు ప్రయత్నం జరగనున్నది. ఏతావాతా ఈ చర్యలన్నీ 2014లో కాంగ్రెస్‌ తిరిగి అధికారానికి రావటం ఎలా అన్న ఏకైక ఎజెండా చుట్టూ తిరగనున్నాయి.